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Meriwether avoids mention of how news about Nkrumah's growing domestic 
opposition in the later 1950s was absorbed in America. When local complexi- 
ties could not be ignored, how were they rendered irrelevant in the newly imag- 
ined Africa? Meriwether's own epilogue highlights the value of such questions. 
The end of the last classic anti-colonial liberation struggle in South Africa in 
1994 finally dissolved the context in which black Americans could identify 
with Afiicans as noble nationalists. As conditions call for a new image of 
Afiica it would be useful to understand more about the image that reigned in 
the late twentieth century, as well as how the previous image dissipated. 
Philip S. Zachernuk 
Dalhousie University 
David Cunningham, There b Something Happening Here: The New Left, the 
Klan, and FBI Counterintelligence (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2004). 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rise of VENONA, the emphasis in his- 
torical writing about intelligence has been on what "they" (foreign intelligence 
services and Communists) were doing to "us" (the state) not what "we" (the 
state) did to "ourselves" (ordinary citizens). The response of the state, be it in 
the United States, Canada, or the United Kingdom to the attacks of September 
11, however, has reiterated the importance of the domestic security environ- 
ment, particularly with respect to civil liberties. David Cunningham's book, 
There b Something Happening Here, is a timely reminder of why. 
In examining domestic security operations by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation in the 1960s, There b Something Happening Here represents a 
new stage in the historical writing on the topic. Previous work consisted of a 
mixture of memoirs, histories written by activists, and more complex studies 
by historians writing with greater detachment, yet who had still lived through 
at least part of J. Edgar Hoover's redolent reign. 
Cunningham's study, on the other hand, is part of a welcomed stage where- 
by academics without any connection to the events they are writing about bring 
a more thorough and less emotional perspective to the subject matter. Equally 
significant is his sociological/historical approach to the topic which allows him 
to avoid simply telling us what the FBI did, as others before him have already 
done. Instead in a comparative fashion he focuses on what the FBI was, how it 
went about its work, what that work was, and the impact that it had. 
In this case that work was the Counter Intelligence Program, or COIN- 
TELPRO for short, which served as a weapon of destruction for a police force 
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not content to watch passively but rather desiring to take the war to its enemies. 
Although the types of tactics associated with it predate its creation, COIN- 
TELPRO oEcially began in 1956 when the FBI targeted the Communist Party 
of the United States for obliteration. Later, in the 1960s, the Bureau's list of tar- 
gets for COINTELPRO grew dramatically, encompassing a wide range of 
groups on the left and even some on the right. It is here that Cunningham offers 
a unique approach by comparing the nature of the COINTELPRO operations 
directed against the amorphous New Left with those employed against right- 
wing "white hate groups." 
In taking this comparative approach Cunningham finds a surprising level 
of consistency as the Bureau employed many similar methods against both tar- 
gets. Where it differed, primarily due to the FBI's own institutional perspec- 
tive, was in COINTELPRO's goals in dealing with them. For the New Left the 
end objective was its complete annihilation. Driving this was the Bureau's hos- 
tility toward activists not because of their actions but because of their beliefs. 
The FBI from Hoover on down perceived these as being anathema to every- 
thing the Bureau represented. On the other hand, the desired result against 
racist organizations was not elimination but containment. Indeed, the FBI tar- 
geted racist groups in the first place not because of their abhorrent views but 
because they advocated and used violence. From the Bureau's patriotic per- 
spective, Klan members did not "hate" America the way the New Left did, but 
instead were misguided or poorly educated patriots who would otherwise be 
harmless. This speaks to the ideological bias inherent in the FBI in its dnve to 
ensure the maintenance of the status quo. In places the police and racists even 
shared a worldview: Klan depictions of Martin Luther King Jr. reflected some 
of the same characterizations applied to him by Hoover. 
If this important book has a flaw it is in Cunningham's failure to delve 
even further into the FBI's mindset. More biographical information on the 
agents involved would have strengthened the work's presentation of how the 
FBI as an institution viewed its respective targets on the racist right and the rad- 
ical left. 
Although somewhat problematic in attempting to address post-September 
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program discussed as if still active was, in fact, cancelled, in part because of 
negative publicity), Cunningham raises questions of relevance not just to the 
finctioning of the FBI or any domestic security agency but to society as a 
whole. The lack of a clear and narrow definition of what terrorism is, coupled 
with, and here Cunningham does not make his point strongly enough in the 
conclusion, an institutional emphasis on pursuing terrorists with career rewards 
for those taking the most aggressively ambitious paths, will inevitably lead to 
significant abuses of civil liberties. Cunningham calls for vigilance against the 
activities of security agencies, not an easy task given the veil of secrecy that 
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cloaks their work. Still, his book represents an invaluable contribution through 
surveillance of the past to promoting alertness for the present and future. 
Steve Hewitt 
University of Birmingham, UK 
Paul Rutherford, Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against 
Iraq (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004). 
Although it is now commonplace to observe the way in which politics is 
increasingly reliant on marketing strategies to deliver its message, rarely is 
such an observation so rigorously and compellingly pursued as it is in Paul 
Rutherford's Weapons of Mass Persuasion. Rutherford provides a bracing 
account of the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq and details how the Bush 
administration packaged and sold the war with great success to the American 
public. Bush's address to the nation in March 2003, just days before the actual 
invasion began, was less a report to the citizenry on matters crucial to the 
nation than the culmination of the elaborate promotional campaign designed 
specifically to transform the idea of war against Iraq into a desirable product. 
By the time the bombs starting falling on Baghdad, enthusiasm for the war 
had reached a fevered pitch among certain sectors of the American public, and 
all that was left for the Bush administration to do was to deliver this product to 
eager consumers. The news media served as the ideal distribution mechanism 
for this. Whatever the opportunities the Intemet provided to assemble a dis- 
senting or dissonant account of the events in Iraq, television retained its privi- 
leged place as the primary source for information about the war. Rutherford is 
at his most incisive and illuminating in detailing the experience of "real-time 
war" as broadcast on the trinity of twenty-four-hour news channels that control 
the American market: CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. But such a "real-time 
war" could not have occurred without the Pentagon serving as its CO-producer, 
not simply in terms of actually waging the war that served as the raw material 
for television reports, but by investing in all manner of media technology to 
ensure that it would be the primary content provider for the media's coverage. 
The quirks of advanced technology came to define a Pentagon house-style. 
Ranging from the greenish hue of the footage gleaned from night cams 
attached to soldiers' helmets to the perpetually disintegrating pixellated images 
bounced from desert to satellite to newsroom, these stylistic tics served to 
authenticate the reports filtered, processed, and often completely assembled by 
the Pentagon that the news channels fi-equently conveyed without question or 
commentary. 
